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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Melissa Heiner contends the district court erred by denying her request for, or
alternatively, by denying her motion for a new trial based on the failure to give, a jury instruction
in her trial for possession of methamphetamine. Specifically, she requested the district court
instruct the jury that a reasonable ignorance or mistake of fact which disproves any criminal
intent means a person is not capable of committing the charged offense in accordance with I.C.
§ 18-201(1).1 Since that instruction properly stated the law, was supported by some evidence in
the case, and was not covered by the other instructions, the district court was required to give it.
Therefore, this Court should vacate the verdict and judgment of conviction and remand this case
for a new trial.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
Ms. Heiner was suffering from a headache while at work, and so, asked her adult son to
bring her some aspirin. (Tr., p.260, Ls.3-9.)2 He did so, but he brought it in a baggie which he
had previously used to hold methamphetamine. (Tr., p.236, L.18 - p.238, L.12.) However, he
thought he had cleaned the baggie out before taking it to his mother. (Tr., p.238, L.24 - p.239,

1

I.C. § 18-201(1) provides:
All persons are capable of committing crimes, except those belonging to the
following classes:

1. Persons who committed the act or made the omission charged, under an
ignorance or mistake of fact which disproves any criminal intent.
2
While there are two volumes of transcripts provided in this case, all citations to “Tr.” in this
brief are to the PDF entitled “TRANSCRIPTS FOR OLIN 44575.pdf.” Although the transcript
pages therein are consecutively paginated, they are not necessarily provided in consecutive order.
3

L.1.) He left the baggie with the aspirin in Ms. Heiner’s purse. (Tr., p.255, Ls.20-22.) She did
not notice anything unusual about the baggie when she took the aspirin. (Tr., p.260, Ls.20-23.)
A few days later, Ms. Heiner and her son were pulled over for an expired registration.
(R., p.19.) Her son, who had been driving, was arrested on an outstanding warrant, and a search
of his person revealed more methamphetamine. (R., p.20.) During a subsequent search of their
truck, the officer searched Ms. Heiner’s purse and found two baggies – one black and the other
white– each inside a different coin purse.3 (Tr., p.135, Ls.3-10.) Both baggies had white,
powdery residue in them. (Tr., p.135, Ls.3-10.) The officer asked Ms. Heiner about the white
baggie, and she said it was the one her son had brought the aspirin in. (Tr., p.137, L.25 - p.138,
L.4.) The officer did not ask Ms. Heiner about the black baggie. (Tr., p.138, Ls.5-7.)
The officer believed the residue in both baggies was methamphetamine, but admitted he
could not distinguish the residue from other benign substances without testing it. 4 (Tr., p.159,
Ls.11-23.) As such, he performed field tests on both baggies. (Tr., p.137, Ls.12-23.) The white
baggie came back presumptively negative, but the black baggie indicated presumptively positive
for methamphetamine. (Tr., p.137, Ls.12-23.) As the officer went to arrest Ms. Heiner, her son,
who believed that the officer had found something of his which he had accidentally dropped,
began shouting that any drugs the officer had found belonged to him. (Tr., p.240, Ls.12-15.) At
trial, Ms. Heiner was asked about the black baggie, and she said she did not recall it being in her
purse, nor could she explain its presence there. (Tr., p.261, Ls.1-6.) However, she denied ever
putting any baggies with methamphetamine in her purse. (Tr., p.261, Ls.7-9.)
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The coin purse with the white baggie also contained a pill which Ms. Heiner identified as
Imodium. (Tr., p.264, Ls.2-7.)
4
The state lab technician who ultimately tested both baggies confirmed that the residue in the
baggies could look like various benign substances. (Tr., p.198, Ls.17-25.)
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Based on this evidence, which was all elicited at trial, defense counsel requested the
district court instruct the jury in accordance with I.C. § 18-201(1) – that a person who commits
an act under an ignorance or mistake of fact which disproves any criminal intent is not capable of
committing a crime. (Tr., p.284, Ls.6-25.) The district court denied that request because it felt
Instruction 15 (the general elements instruction) adequately addressed the point. (Tr., p.286,
Ls.20-21.) Specifically, Instruction 15 informed the jury that one of the elements of possession
of a controlled substance was that “the defendant either knew it was methamphetamine or
believed it was a controlled substance.” (Exhibits, p.24.)5 The jury found Ms. Heiner guilty of
“Possession of a Controlled Substance, Methamphetamine.” (R., p.224.)
Based on the fact that the district court had not given the requested instruction,
Ms. Heiner filed a motion to set aside that verdict as well as a motion for a new trial timely from
the entry of that verdict. (R., p.205-11.) The district court concluded I.C. § 18-201(1) did not
apply to possession of a controlled substance since that is a general intent crime. (R., p.230.) It
also reaffirmed its decision that the issue was covered by the elements instruction. (R., p.230.)
As such, it denied her motions. (R., p.230.)
The district court ultimately imposed a unified sentence of five years, with two years
fixed, which it suspended for a term of four years. (Tr., p.342, Ls.17-19.) Ms. Heiner filed a
notice of appeal timely from the judgement of conviction. (R., pp.236, 243.)

5

Citations to “Exhibits” are to the electronic page numbers of the file entitled “CERTIFICATE
OF EXHIBITS HEINER - aka - Olin 44575.pdf.”
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ISSUES
1.

Whether the district court erred when it denied Ms. Heiner’s request to instruct the jury
pursuant to I.C. § 18-201(1).

2.

Alternatively, whether the district court erred when it denied Ms. Heiner’s motion for a
new trial based on the failure to instruct the jury pursuant to I.C. § 18-201(1).
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ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court Erred When It Denied Ms. Heiner’s Request To Instruct The Jury Pursuant To
I.C. § 18-201(1)
A.

Standard Of Review
Whether the jury was properly instructed is a question of law which the appellate courts

review de novo. State v. Blake, 133 Idaho 237, 239 (1999). Specifically, the appellate courts are
reviewing to determine “whether the instructions as a whole fairly and accurately reflect the
applicable law.” Id. (internal quotation omitted). If an instruction is erroneous and misled or
otherwise prejudiced the jury, the conviction should be vacated. Id. Additionally, “[a] requested
instruction must be given if: (1) it properly states the governing law; (2) a reasonable view of at
least some evidence would support the defendant’s legal theory; (3) the subject of the requested
instruction is not adequately addressed by other jury instructions; and (4) the requested
instruction does not constitute an impermissible comment as to the evidence.” State v. Macias,
142 Idaho 509, 510 (Ct. App. 2005) (emphasis added).

B.

The District Court Needed To Instruct The Jury Under I.C. § 18-201(1) Based On The
Evidence Presented In Ms. Heiner’s Case
Ms. Heiner requested the district court instruct the jury under I.C. § 18-201(1), to the

effect that a person who commits an act under ignorance or mistake of fact which disproves any
criminal intent is not capable of committing the charged offense. (Tr., p.203, L.1 - p.202, L.3;
see R., p.211 (a copy of the requested instruction).)
That instruction properly stated the governing law. As the Idaho Supreme Court has
made clear, when charging a person with possession of a controlled substance,
methamphetamine, “To establish [that person’s] guilt, the State must prove that [the person]

7

knowingly possessed methamphetamine.” Blake, 133 Idaho at 242. As a result, “the defendant’s
ignorance of the identity of a substance would be a defense to a charge of possession of a
controlled substance.” State v. McKean, 159 Idaho 75, 82 (2015); accord Blake, 133 Idaho at
242.

The statutory basis for this defense is I.C. § 18-201(1).

McKean, 159 Idaho at 82.

Therefore, the proposed instruction, which mirrored the applicable statutory language, was a
proper statement of the law.
A reasonable view of at least some evidence supports Ms. Heiner’s theory of defense
under I.C § 18-201(1). In fact, the Idaho Supreme Court has indicated that less evidence than
what was presented here can reasonably support a lack-of-knowledge defense under that statute.
See State v. Lamphere, 130 Idaho 630, 632-33 (1997). In Lamphere, the defendant was charged
with possession of methamphetamine based on his possession of a vial which had residue inside.
Id. at 631. He told officers he did not know what was in the vial, but he thought it “might have
been methamphetamine or something else” because the vial had been given to him by his
girlfriend who, fearing her daughter had become involved in drug use, asked the defendant to
help her figure out what was in the vial. Id. The Idaho Supreme Court indicated there was a
reasonable view of some evidence in that case to support a lack-of-knowledge defense under
I.C. § 18-201(1), such that the defendant in that case should have been allowed to present
evidence in support of that defense to the jury. See id. at 633; cf. Martinez v. State, 143 Idaho
789, 793-95 (Ct. App. 2007) (holding that, if the post-conviction petitioner could prove that he
had not been informed of what the State was required to prove in regard to his knowledge in a
possession of methamphetamine case, he could withdraw his guilty plea based on his claim that
he could have pursued a lack-of-knowledge defense in light of the fact that “the
methamphetamine was placed in his wallet by his girlfriend without his knowledge”).
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The evidence here presents a stronger case in support of the lack-of-knowledge defense
than did the evidence in Lamphere. For example, whereas the defendant in Lamphere knowingly
possessed the container with the residue, the evidence here indicated Ms. Heiner did not know
the container was in her purse. (Tr., p.260, L.24 - p.261, L.3 (Ms. Heiner testifying that she
recalled seeing only one baggie, the one with the aspirin in it, in her purse).) In fact, the State’s
evidence bears this out, since the officer her testified he expressly did not ask Ms. Heiner about
the black baggie. (Tr., p.138, Ls.5-7.)
Additionally, whereas the defendant in Lamphere suspected the residue was
methamphetamine, the evidence in this case indicated Ms. Heiner did not believe any
methamphetamine was in her purse. (Tr., p.261, Ls.7-9.) Furthermore, the evidence from both
the officer and the lab technician reveals that, even if she had seen it, she could not have
determined it was methamphetamine from its appearance. (Tr., p.159, Ls.11-23, Tr., p.198,
Ls.17-25.) In fact, the evidence only indicates Ms. Heiner thought she ever had aspirin and
Imodium in her purse. (Tr., p.260, Ls.3-23, Tr., p.264, Ls.2-7.)
Moreover, Ms. Heiner’s son admitted he believed that the officer had found something of
his which he had accidentally dropped. (Tr., p.240, Ls.12-15.) Thus, one reasonable view of the
evidence in this case is that the baggie had been left in her purse by her son (accidentally or
otherwise), and so, she was reasonably ignorant of the methamphetamine in her purse, and even
if she had seen it, she would not have been able to identify it. That reasonable view of the
evidence, more so than the reasonable view of the evidence in Lamphere, justified presenting a
lack-of-knowledge defense under I.C. §18-201(1) because “[the defendant’s] ignorance or
mistake of fact, if believed by the jury, should disprove any criminal intent, requiring an
acquittal.” Blake, 133 Idaho at 242 (emphasis added).
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The subject of the requested instruction was not adequately covered by the other
instructions. (See Tr., p.286, L.20 - p.287, L.3 (the district court concluding the elements
instruction (Instruction 15) covered the lack-of-knowledge defense).) The elements instruction
given in this case told the jurors that one of the elements of the offense was that Ms. Heiner
“knew it was methamphetamine or believed it was a controlled substance.” (Exhibits, p.24.)
However, it does not follow that, because the jurors were told that she has to have knowledge,
they were also being instructed that a mistake or ignorance deprives her of the capability of
forming the required knowledge. Cf. McKean, 159 Idaho at 82 (noting that persons who fall
under I.C. § 18-201(1) “are not ‘capable’ of committing crimes”). The Idaho Supreme Court has
recently, repeatedly held that this is a particular twist on the general elements formulation which
provides a defense from liability. See id.; State v. Goggin, 157 Idaho 1, 10 (2014) (“[t]his
knowledge element requires that the defendant know the identity of the substance.”).

If the

general instruction adequately covered that defense, there would never be a situation where that
instruction would be given, despite the problems that the general instruction can cause as it
relates to that defense. For example, in Blake, the general instruction “allow[ed] the jury to
convict [the defendant] if he knew there was some substance under his seat and something in the
wallet but truly, although negligently, believed those substances to be harmless items such as
sugar.”

Blake, 133 Idaho at 242.

Therefore, the general elements instruction does not

adequately cover this defense.
Finally, the requested instruction did not constitute a comment on the evidence. It would
only have told the jurors that the law recognizes there may be certain circumstances in which a
person is not capable of forming the requisite knowledge; it would not have told them whether or
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not those circumstances were present in this case. Rather, it would have left that question of fact
solely for the jury’s determination.
Since the lack-of-knowledge instruction Ms. Heiner requested was a correct statement of
the law, and because it was necessary to accurately and fairly instruct the jury on the law relevant
to their decision given the facts presented, the district court erred by refusing to give that
instruction.
II.
Alternatively, The District Court Erred When It Denied Ms. Heiner’s Motion For A New Trial
Based On The Failure To Instruct The Jury Pursuant To I.C. § 18-201(1)
A.

Standard Of Review
The appellate courts review a ruling on a motion for new trial for an abuse of discretion,

but exercises free review over questions of law included therein. Goggin, 157 Idaho at 4. When
an appellate court reviews a discretionary decision, it looks at: “(1) whether the lower court
rightly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the court acted within the outer
boundaries of such discretion and consistently with any legal standards applicable to specific
choices; and (3) whether the court reached its decision by an exercise of reason.”
State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 600 (1989).

B.

Neither Of The Reasons The District Court Gave For Denying The Motion For A New
Trial Are Proper
The district court gave two reasons for denying Ms. Heiner’s motion for a new trial: first,

that the elements instruction adequately covered the I.C. § 18-201(1) issues; and second, that
I.C. § 18-201(1) does not apply to possession of controlled substance charges because they are
general intent crimes. (R., p.230.) Neither conclusion is consistent with the applicable legal
standards, and so, the district court’s decision fails on the second step of the Hedger analysis.
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As to the district court’s first rationale, that decision is erroneous because, as discussed in
Section I(B), supra, the elements instruction did not tell the jury that, if it found Ms. Heiner
acted under ignorance or mistake of fact, she would not have been capable of forming the
requisite knowledge. Therefore, the elements instruction did not adequately instruct the jurors
on the I.C. § 18-201(1) issue.
As to the district court’s second rationale, that decision is directly opposite to the Idaho
Supreme Court’s holding in its recent decision in McKean:
The statutory basis for a defense based upon mistake of fact is Idaho Code section
18-201, which provides that ‘[p]ersons who committed the act or made the
omission charged, under an ignorance or mistake of fact which disproves any
criminal intent’ are not ‘capable’ of committing crimes. Thus, the defendant’s
ignorance of the identity of a substance would be a defense to a charge of
possession of a controlled substance.
McKean, 159 Idaho at 82 (quoting I.C. § 18-201(1)) (emphasis added). Therefore, regardless of
whether possession of a controlled substance is a general intent crime, the Idaho Supreme Court
has specifically held that I.C. § 18-201(1) applies to charges in that regard.
Since the district court’s analysis is inconsistent with the legal standards applicable to
specific choices, it abused its discretion by denying Ms. Heiner’s motion for a new trial.

CONCLUSION
Ms. Heiner respectfully requests this Court vacate the verdict and judgment and remand
this case for a new trial.
DATED this 12th day of May, 2017.
/s/
BRIAN R. DICKSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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